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EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EPPO: 
COOPERATION CHALLENGES WITH CROATIA 
AND EUROPOL
This paper focuses on the role of Europol in the implementation of 
the EPPO Regulation and analyses the potential challenges for law 
enforcement in Croatia. For this purpose, a comparative method is 
used and future ideas for the practical implementation of the Regula-
tion within Europol are presented. Part of the paper focuses on explain-
ing the legal background of the work of the EPPO and its relation to 
Europol and Croatia. It then explains the challenges and opportuni-
ties for Europol after the EPPO becomes fully operational, includ-
ing Europol analytical capacities, the possibilities for information 
exchange (SIENA), and Europol innovation capacities. In conclusion, 
the paper analyses concrete challenges and offers solutions for differ-
ent problems that may arise in future relations between Europol and 
the EPPO. An outline is also given of the priorities of the Presidency of 
Croatia of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2020 
related to financial investigation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to answer the question of what kind of external relations are fore-
seen by the EPPO and what the cooperation challenges are for the future coop-
eration of Croatia and Europol for its implementation, it is primarily important 
to analyse the scope of work of the EPPO Regulation. The next step is to 
answer the question of when international cooperation is necessary for proper 
proceedings. The third question is what instruments might be “offered” by a 
particular international organisation to help in the implementation. Finally, it 
is necessary to gain an overview at the national level and to foresee the predict-
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the implementation of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 
(hereinafter: EPPO Regulation) is limited “to criminal offences affecting the 
financial interests of the Union in accordance with this Regulation. The tasks 
of the EPPO should thus be to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment the 
perpetrators of offences against the Union’s financial interests under Directive 
(EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council”.1 Any exten-
sion of the competence that includes an international dimension requires the 
unanimous decision of the European Council. For the first time, use is made of 
the term “shared competence” between the EPPO and national authorities in 
combating crimes that affect financial interests. In this paper, emphasis is 
given to the role of Europol in the implementation of the EPPO Regulation, 
cooperation between law enforcement bodies (police/customs and prosecu-
tors), and some future challenges that may influence the whole process.
2. SCOPE OF THE EPPO REGULATION
Point 11 of the Preamble of the EPPO Regulation defines its scope of work 
(to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment perpetrators of offences pre-
scribed in Directive (EU) 2017/1371) (hereinafter: Directive 2017/1371).2 
Article 2 of Directive 2017/1371 defines the “Union’s financial interests” as 
“all revenues, expenditure and assets covered by, acquired through, or due to 
… the Union budget [and] the budgets of the Union institutions, bodies offices 
and agencies established pursuant to the Treaties or budget directly or indi-
rectly managed or monitored by them”.
A legal person in the same article is defined as “an entity having legal per-
sonality under the applicable law, except for States or public bodies in the 
exercise of State authority and for public international organisations”.
Regarding revenue arising from VAT own resources, Directive 2017/1371 
applies only to serious offences against the common VAT system. Serious 
offences are, according to Article 2 of Directive 2017/1371, “intentional acts or 
omissions defined in point (d) of Article 3(2)3 … connected with the territory 
1 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced coop-
eration on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] 
OJ L283/1, Preamble (11). 
2 Directive 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on 
the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law [2017] OJ 
L198/29. 
3 Any act of omission committed in cross-border fraudulent schemes in relation to: a) the 
use or presentation of false, incorrect of incomplete VAT-related statements or documents, 
which has as its effect the diminution of the resources of the Union budget: b) non- disclosure 
of VAT-related information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect; or c) the 
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of two or more Member States of the Union and involve a total damage of at 
least EUR 10 000 000”.
Article 3 of Directive 2017/1371 defines fraud affecting the Union’s finan-
cial interests, dividing it in respect of non-procurement-related expenditure, 
procurement-related expenditure, revenue other than revenue arising from 
VAT own resources, and revenue arising from VAT own resources. Non-pro-
curement-related expenditure is defined as an act or omission relating to the 
use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, 
which has as its effect the misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds or 
assets from the Union budget or budgets managed by the Union, or on its 
behalf, non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation with 
the same effect and use of such funds for purposes other than those for which 
they were granted.
Procurement-related expenditure can be defined in a similar way to 
non-procurement-related expenditure: it might be caused by an act or omission 
in order to make an unlawful gain by causing a loss to the Union’s financial 
interests.
Revenue other than revenue arising from VAT own resources is defined as 
an act or omission relating to the use or presentation of false, incorrect or 
incomplete statements or documents, which has as its effect the illegal diminu-
tion of the resources of the Union budget or budgets managed by the Union, or 
on its behalf, the non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obli-
gation, with the same effect; or the misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, 
with the same effect.
Revenue arising from VAT own resources are similarly defined as an act or 
omission committed in cross-border fraudulent schemes in relation to the use 
or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete VAT-related statements or 
documents which has as an effect the diminution of the resources of the Union 
budget, non-disclosure of VAT-related information and the presentation of cor-
rect VAT-related statements for the purpose of fraudulently disguising the 
non-payment or wrongful creation of rights to VAT refunds. 
Article 4 of Directive 2017/1371 prescribes the obligation of Member States 
to “take necessary measures to ensure that money laundering described in Art. 
1(3) of Directive (EU) 2015/8494 involving property derived from the criminal 
presentation of correct VAT-related statements for the purposes of fraudulently disguising the 
non-payment or wrongful creation of rights to VAT refunds.
4 Money laundering, if committed intentionally, is regarded as: a) the conversion or trans-
fer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of 
participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of 
the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an activity 
to evade the legal consequences of that person’s action; b) the concealment or disguise of the 
236
M. Rošić: External Relations of the EPPO: Cooperation Challenges with Croatia and Europol
Hrvatski ljetopis za kaznene znanosti i praksu (Zagreb), vol. 27, broj 1/2020, str. 233-243.
offences covered by this Directive constitute a criminal offence”. Further, 
Member States shall “take the necessary measures to ensure that passive and 
active corruption, when committed intentionally, constitute criminal offences”.5
Directive 2017/1371 also prescribes that misappropriation, when committed 
intentionally, constitutes a criminal offence. The term “misappropriation” is 
related to the action of a public official “who is directly or indirectly entrusted 
with the management of funds or assets to commit or disburse funds or appro-
priate or use assets contrary to the purpose for which they were intended in any 
way which damages the Union’s financial interests”. It is important to mention 
that a “public official” might be a “Union official” (an official or other servant 
under contract by the EU but also one seconded to the EU) and “national offi-
cial” who includes “any person holding an executive, administrative or judicial 
office at national, regional or local level”. The definition also includes persons 
“assigned and exercising a public service function involving the management of 
or decisions concerning the Union’s financial interests in Member States or 
third countries”. To conclude, it is a very wide definition that includes the local 
level as well as those persons who are engaged in third countries.
Inciting and aiding and abetting the commission of criminal offences 
against the EU budget (fraud, corruption, or serious cross-border VAT fraud) 
should be punishable as criminal offences by the Member States.
Each Member State is obliged to “take necessary measures to establish its 
jurisdiction” if the criminal offence is committed in whole or in part within its 
territory or if the offender is one of its nationals. A Member State may inform 
the European Commission and extend its jurisdiction if the offender is a habit-
ual resident in its territory, if the criminal offence is committed for the benefit 
of a legal person established in its territory, or if the offender is one of its offi-
cials who acts in his or her official duty.
true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, 
property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of par-
ticipation in such an activity; (c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the 
time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of partic-
ipation in such an activity; (d) participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and 
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions referred to 
in points (a), (b) and (c). Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC 
[2015] OJ L 141/73. Croatia is in line with this definition. See Article 265 of the Criminal Code 
of the Republic of Croatia.
5 Croatia is in line with this definition. See Articles 252, 253 , 293 and 294 of the Criminal 
Code (consolidated version).
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Article 10 of Directive 2017/1371 invites Member States to take necessary 
measures to enable the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and pro-
ceeds of criminal offences in accordance with Directive 2014/42/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. Following the entry into force of the 
EPPO Regulation, Regulation 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition of freezing 
orders and confiscation orders have entered into force6 and should be imple-
mented from 19 December 2020. It covers freezing and confiscation orders 
issued without a final conviction. Even if this kind of order (without a final 
conviction) does not exist in the legal system of a Member State, that Member 
State should be able to recognise and execute such orders issued by another 
Member State. Freezing orders and confiscation orders in civil or administra-
tive matters are not within the scope of that Regulation.7
Article 3 of Regulation 2018/1805 defines criminal offences that must be 
executed without verification of double criminality. In paragraph 1(8) of the 
same Article, all criminal offences referred to in Directive 2017/1371 are spe-
cifically mentioned. It is to be expected that until 22 November 2020 when 
the EPPO Regulation should be implemented, Regulation 2018/1805 on the 
mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation will improve the 
exchange of orders. 
3. THE EPPO IN RELATION TO EUROPOL
Unlike Directive 2017/1371 that does not stipulate cooperation with 
Europol,8 Article 102 of the EPPO Regulation clearly defines cooperation with 
Europol. Moreover, the EPPO is invited to establish cooperation with Europol 
in the form of working arrangements. Further, the EPPO “shall be able to 
obtain … any information held by Europol, concerning any offence within its 
competence”. It is also interesting that the EPPO may ask Europol to provide 
analytical support for a specific investigation.
This raises many questions for the future daily work of Europol. Europol 
already has standardised “working arrangements” which cover, inter alia, the 
field of work, data exchange and (personal) data protection rules. What 
“Europol data” might be exchanged? Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 
(hereinafter: Europol Regulation)9 answers that question: Personal data may be 
6 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 
2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders [2018] OJ L 303/1. 
7 For more about the EU legal framework on confiscation, see Europol Criminal Assets 
Bureau, <https://polis.osce.org/file/21391/download?token=Bp2pf0I_> accessed 24 April 2020.
8 Article 15 of Directive 2017/1371 relates to cooperation.
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 
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processed only for the purposes of: cross-checking aimed at identifying con-
nections or other relevant links between information related to persons who 
are suspected of having committed or taken part in a criminal offence in 
respect of which Europol is competent, or who have been convicted of such an 
offence; persons regarding whom there are factual indications or reasonable 
grounds to believe that they will commit criminal offences in respect of which 
Europol is competent; for the analyses of a strategic or thematic nature; for 
operational analyses and for facilitating the exchange of information between 
Member States, Europol, other Union bodies, third countries and international 
organisations. 
Operational analyses provided by Europol are subject to strict rules and 
should be performed by means of operational analysis projects. Within every 
operational analysis project, the Executive Director shall, in accordance with 
Article 18 of the Europol Regulation, “define the specific purpose, categories 
of personal data and categories of data subjects, participants, duration of stor-
age and conditions for access, transfer and use of the data concerned, and shall 
inform the Management Board and the EDPS10 thereof”. Personal data may 
only be collected and processed for the purpose of the specified operational 
analysis project. Where it becomes apparent that personal data may be rele-
vant for another operational analysis project, further processing of those per-
sonal data shall only be permitted insofar as such further processing is neces-
sary and proportionate and the personal data are compatible with the provi-
sions that apply to the other analysis project. Those who provide information 
to Europol (Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international 
organisations) may indicate any restriction on access to the information pro-
vided or the use to be made thereof. 
The principles of cooperation between Eurojust, OLAF and Europol are 
prescribed in Article 21 of the Europol Regulation. Both Eurojust and OLAF, 
within their respective mandates, have indirect access on the basis of a hit/no 
hit system to information described in Article 18(2) of the Europol Regulation. 
In the case of a hit, Europol will ask the “provider” of the information whether 
it is willing to share information with Eurojust and OLAF. If the same princi-
ples apply for cooperation with EPPO, the period from the positive crossmatch 
until Europol approval for the use of information might take more time. This 
particular problem will apply especially if the data provider is a country that 
does not implement the EPPO Regulation.11
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing 
and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/
JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L 135/53.
10 European Data Protection Supervisor.
11 UK, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Hungary - situation in April 2019.
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Another potential problem is what will happen if countries put the H212 
Handling Code on the information provided? This information is not automat-
ically cross-matched and will not be available to the EPPO. 
However, it is of essential importance to make the SIENA13 channel avail-
able to the EPPO in order to exchange, transfer and receive data in a standard-
ised format and to use Europol capacities in fast data exchange. If a working 
arrangement between the EPPO and Europol is concluded, the EPPO, like 
Eurojust, can actively participate in data exchange via SIENA. SIENA is avail-
able to Eurojust and predominantly to the law enforcement community that 
will, mutatis mutandis, be responsible in different countries for the practical 
execution of the requests of judicial authorities.
What are Europol analytical capacities for support at the moment? Particu-
lar interest focuses on analytical projects (hereinafter: AP),14 MTIC,15 APA-
TE,16 Smoke,17 Asset Recovery,18 and Sustrans.19 
Two specialists and two analysts are working on the activities of AP MTIC, 
two specialists and three analysts are working on AP SMOKE, and one spe-
cialist and one analyst are engaged in APATE.20 In all three APs in 2018, a 
total of 68 operations were supported, and 716 contributions were received 
related to MTIC 716, a total of 1,286 for SMOKE, and 4,020 for APATE. 
Seven operational meetings were organised in MTIC, 25 in AP SMOKE and 
16 in AP APATE. Europol supported arrests in 63 MTIC cases, 185 in SMOKE 
cases, and 75 in APATE cases.
12 This information must not be disseminated without the permission of the provider. 
13 SIENA – Secure Information Exchange Network Application. A Europol data exchange 
system that enables secure and swift transmission of sensitive and restricted data. 
14 The purpose of the Operational Analysis Project is to support competent authorities of 
the Member States as well as Union bodies, third countries and international organisations 
which are associated to the Operational Analysis Project in preventing and combating offences 
committed with the intention to defraud under false and deceitful pretexts resulting in the 
voluntary but unlawful transfer of values or goods or an undue advantage to the fraudsters.
15 Activities of criminal organisations involved in Missing Trader Intra Community 
(MTIC) fraud as well as other related criminal activities uncovered in the course of investiga-
tions into these groups.
16 Preventing and combating offences committed with the intention to defraud under false 
and deceitful pretexts resulting in the voluntary but unlawful transfer of values or goods or an 
undue advantage to the fraudsters.
17 Organised crime networks engaged in excise fraud in the Member States as well as any 
associated criminal activities within Europol’s mandate uncovered in the course of the inves-
tigation into these criminal networks.
18 Tracing and identification of criminal proceeds linked to the mandated crime areas of 
Europol.
19 Support of the competent authorities in money-laundering activities, in particular 
through the analysis of information contained in financial intelligence reports.
20 Situation in March 2019.
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Future cooperation with the EPPO is an opportunity for Europol to 
strengthen its position as a criminal information hub and as a centre for exper-
tise in financial investigation. If, in each Member State that has ratified the 
EPPO Regulation, there are at least two delegated prosecutors who will lead 
the investigation, and if Europol treats the request from investigators as high 
priority cases, it will be necessary to increase the number of specialists and 
analysts in each AP. Roughly, if each prosecutor on average opens just one case 
a year, that means 44 new cases. 
During 2019 and later in 2020, Europol made a significant organisational 
change, introducing a special “sector” dealing with financial crime. As of the 
second half of 2019, Europol has been implementing a principle based on High 
Value Targets (on high profile criminals, measured by specific criteria) with 
the possibility of arranging an Operational Task Force that should have many 
more resources available for concrete criminal investigation. There are some 
internal reorganisation challenges that are being tackled which should improve 
the analytical capacities of Europol. Whether these will be sufficient still 
remains an open question.
The next important point for Europol is to consider opening a new AP to deal 
with all kinds of corruption described in the EPPO Regulation and Directive 
2017/1371. At the moment, an AP on Sport Corruption has begun to operate.
Another challenge is how to ensure cooperation between the EPPO and 
Europol. A possible solution is to install a Liaison Office at the EPPO in Lux-
embourg. 
In order to avoid duplication and enable swift data transfer, technical solu-
tions are being developed by Europol that might help in accurate, swift, and 
fast data exchange. Europol can also enable the transfer of huge amounts of 
data which might be a challenge in future common financial investigations.
4. CONCLUSION
The EPPO is structured both at the central and national level. Its central 
level (the European Chief Prosecutor, his or her two Deputies, 22 European 
Prosecutors – one per participating Member State, two of whom as Deputies of 
the European Chief Prosecutor and the Administrative Director) supervises 
investigations and prosecutions at the national level. This directly influences 
national criminal investigation that has so far been under the sovereignty of the 
States. There are many open questions about such a “balance of powers”, 
including cooperation with the EPPO in investigations, etc. 
Cooperation with third parties or international bodies like Europol might, 
at a later stage, affect procedural rights and the free movement of evidence in 
EPPO cases and will directly have an impact on cross-border data sharing.
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Future relations between Europol and EPPO will be based on working 
arrangements. Questions still to be answered concern the kind of analytical 
support and the kind of information that might be provided by Europol. Fur-
ther questions are the length of time it takes to provide information, whether or 
not the data owner uses the H2 code, and what resources Europol has for the 
analytical support of concrete criminal investigations.
If we take into account the wider concept, it is clear that within the next 
financial period of 2021-2027 more financial support should be foreseen for 
the full implementation of the EPPO Regulation. How are these means going 
to be disseminated? They will most probably be disseminated via ISF – Police. 
There is still discussion on the Multiannual Financial Framework for Law 
Enforcement and, with Brexit, it is very questionable how much will be pro-
vided for EPPO implementation.
The laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in the EU is estimated 
annually to amount to EUR 110 billion ($124.19 billion).21 The EPPO Regula-
tion is not implemented in all EU countries, since there are some countries that 
do not apply it and at the same time are “accused” by the European Parliament 
of being tax heavens for money laundering.22
What is the current situation in Croatia?
From 1 January 2011 to 28 February 2019, permanently confiscated pro-
ceeds of crime, after a final judgment, were recorded to a total amount of HRK 
173.6 million23 in cash, 11 real estate properties, seven vehicles, one construc-
tion plot, precious metals valued at HRK 950,000, cell phones, IT equipment, 
household appliances and a cannabis breeding laboratory.24 
If we compare this with overall criminal gains, the results could be much 
better.
What is the position of Croatia as a country holding the Presidency of the 
EU Council in the first half of 2020?
21 “European Parliament report accuses seven countries, including Cyprus, of acting as 
tax havens”. Ekathimerini.com (26 March 2019 2019) <http://www.ekathimerini.com/238910/
article/ekathimerini/news/european-parliament-report-accuses-seven-countries-including-cy-
prus-of-acting-as-tax-havens> accessed 24 April 2020.
22 Luxembourg, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Hungary, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
  The document is the result of a year’s work by the parliament’s committee on financial 
crime and tax evasion. The report has now been adopted by the whole assembly, boosting its 
political weight, though it remains non-binding.
23 EUR 1 is approximately HRK 7.4.
24 V. Mo, “Pogledajte koliko je država kriminalcima oduzela novca, nekretnina, vozila, 
nakita, satova….” Tportal.hr (27 March 2019) <https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/drza-
va-presudama-oduzela-173-6-milijuna-kuna-gotovine-11-nekretnina-sedam-vozila-gradevins-
ko-zemljiste-foto-20190327?utm_source=Linker.hr&utm_medium=widget&utm_cam-
paign=razmjena%2bprometa> accessed 24 April 2020. 
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Financial investigations per se and other connected criminal proceedings 
such as money laundering (with special emphasis on money laundering via 
crypto currencies), asset recovery and the EU norms on the control of cash 
entering or leaving the EU25 will be one of the priority fields in financial inves-
tigation during Croatia’s Presidency. Knowledge gained by some Member 
States and exchanged via Europol might be of essential benefit for EU Member 
States as a whole, the EPPO and Europol. 
Regulation 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and 
confiscation orders26 aims to make the freezing and confiscation of criminal 
assets across the EU quicker and simpler. The Regulation27 is not limited to 
particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension, and non-recogni-
tion because of fundamental rights infringements will only be possible in 
exceptional situations. The executing authority should start conducting the 
specific measures necessary to execute such orders no later than 48 hours after 
the decision on the recognition and execution thereof has been taken. This 
mechanism, together with the full implementation of the EPPO Regulation, 
may lead to better interconnectivity and provide proper tools in saving the 
financial interests of the EU. It will also lay a solid foundation for improved 
international cooperation. 
It seems that the work of the EPPO will rely, at least at the very beginning, 
on the power of national authorities. In data exchange, the EPPO may find a 
suitable partner in Europol by using its capacities: the SIENA channel for data 
exchange, analytical support, premises for the organisation of operational 
meetings, a new innovation environment (Europol as a hub of innovation at the 
EU level) and available resources (the Europol fund for the implementation of 
specific criminal financial investigations).
25 Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 
2018 on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1889/2005 [2018] OJ L284/6.
26 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders [2018] 
OJ L 303/1.
27 For more about provisions of the Regulation, see: https://eucrim.eu/news/regula-
tion-freezing-and-confiscation-orders/.
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Sažetak
VANJSKI ODNOSI UREDA EJT-a: IZAZOVI SURADNJE  
S HRVATSKOM I EUROPOLOM
U radu se obrađuje primjena Uredbe o europskom javnom tužitelju u kontekstu odnosa 
prema trenutačnom ustroju, radu, funkcioniranju i mogućnostima koje pruža Europol. U radu 
se prikazuje i širi kontekst s kojim se cjelokupna zajednica suočava u početku operativne pri-
mjene postupanja u skladu s Uredbom o Uredu EJT-a. Pod širim kontekstom podrazumijevaju 
se načelne aktivnosti koje provodi Hrvatska kao predsjedateljica EU-a u području financij-
skih istraga, izazovi koji su nastali izlaskom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva iz EU-a, kao i postupak 
povodom definiranja višegodišnjega financijskog okvira EU-a za financijsko razdoblje 2021.-
2027. Ipak, u radu se u prvom redu razmatra odnos Ureda EJT-a i Europola: kako se i kojim 
sredstvima može ostvariti kvalitetna, brza i pouzdana razmjena podataka te koje su pravne 
pretpostavke za uspostavu i realizaciju takve suradnje.
Rad je metodološki određen korištenjem komparativne metode u analizi pravnog okvira 
za uspostavu Ureda EJT-a te empirijske metode u dijelu koji se odnosi na rad, funkcioniranje 
i praktične aktivnosti koje poduzima Europol oko prilagodbe za punu primjenu postupanja u 
skladu s Uredom EJT-a. 
U odnosu na moguće izazove autor nudi konkretne prijedloge rješenja. Tako se primjerice 
u odnosu na razmjenu podataka između dva tijela predlaže korištenje sigurnog Europolova ko-
munikacijskog kanala (SIENA). Nadalje, predlaže se korištenje mogućnosti koje nudi Europol 
kroz financiranje određenih aktivnosti Europolovim sredstvima, ali se upozorava i na moguće 
teškoće prilikom analitičke obrade podataka koju provodi Europol. U potonjem slučaju radi se, 
osim o mogućoj potkapacitiranosti Europola, i o pravnim nedoumicama, za koje autor ponov-
no nudi rješenje za korekciju kroz novelu odredaba Uredbe o Europolu. U zaključnim razma-
tranjima autor konstatira kako su pred Uredom EJT-a, Europolom i državama članicama veliki 
izazovi oko primjene novoga zakonodavstva EU-a usmjerenoga na jačanje suradnje u provedbi 
financijskih istraga. Kvalitetna obrada podataka moguća je kroz usmjereniju aktivnost svih 
sudionika, otvaranjem komunikacijskih aktivnosti i sinergijskim analitičkim djelovanjem. 
Ključne riječi: Ured EJT-a, Europol, Hrvatska, financijska istraga, SIENA, prijevara u vezi 
s PDV-om, kriptovaluta 
